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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). But this does not com-
pletely solve the problem, because immediately, in transferring all
such cases to the United States for trial, additional problems such
as cost, delay and difficulty in obtaining witnesses arise.
It thus appears that, while the Supreme Court was endeavoring
to solve one problem, some other problems posing far greater difll-
cultie2s have arisen. What is to be the fate of the offenders in the
principal cases and like offenders in the future? Are they to be tried
by the foreign countries in which the crimes were committed? Or
will the government attempt to have these countries waive their
jurisdiction so that the trials may be had in civilian courts in the
United States? Or will the accused persons be set free without
any trials?
Is it not possible that the employment and application of the
principles of the principal cases may in the years ahead result in
roadblocks to justice because of the running of statutes of limita-
tion, -the death or disappearance of witnesses, prohibitive costs,
discouraging delays and other impediments to orderly and effective
judicial administration?
A. M. P.
CoNsTrrutIoNAL LAw-DUE PRocEss-EvmEccE REQUImED To
SusTAIN CUMmAL CONVlCrION.-P was a longtime resident of the
Louisville, Kentucky, area and a frequent patron at a cafe in that
city. He entered the cafe one evening to enjoy the facilities thereof
while waiting for a bus. Two policemen, on a "routine check,"
inquired of the cafe manager as to how long P had been there and
whether he had bought anything. The manager replied that he
persornally had not served anything to P (P's testimony was that
one of the employees serving him a dish of macaroni and a glass of
beer). The officer accosted P and "asked him what was his reason
for being in there and he said he was waiting on a bus." The officer
then informed P he was under arrest and took him outside. P asked
why he was being arrested (the officer testified that P was argu-
mentative). P had a record of 54 previous arrests. The Police
Court of Louisville found P guilty of two offenses-loitering and
disorderly conduct-and fined him $10.00 on each charge. Upon
examination of P's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States found that, although the fines were small, due process
questions were substantial and granted certiorari. Held, complete
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absence of any evidence to support convictions for loitering and
disorderly conduct renders such convictions violative of the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Thompson v. City of Louis-
ville, 80 Sup. Ct. 624 (1960).
The principal case is interesting from several viewpoints. The
basic facts of the case are colorful in themselves. See Time, The
Weekly Magazine, Shufflinf Sam's Long Step, April 4, 1960, p. 15.
But when combined with the unusual routing of the case from a
lowly police court directly to the highest court in the land, plus
the substantiality of the constitutional questions involved, the case
develops singularity with the possibility of far-reaching proportions.
The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution provides: "...
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1. Due process of law has been defined as those fundamental
principles which protect the citizen's private rights and guard against
the arbitrary action of government. Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908). The due process clause is a constitutional guaran-
tee of respect for those basic personal immunities which are so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental or are implicit in the concept or ordered liberty.
Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). The term does not
admit of precise definition. Barnett v. Cook County, 877 IMI. 251,
57 N.E.2d 838 (1944). It has been judicially observed that the
due process clause exacts from the state, for the most lowly and
outcast, all that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, em-
bracing all those rights which courts must enforce because they are
basic to a free society. Wolf v. Colorado, 838 U.S. 25 (1949).
The states are free to provide their own procedures and stand-
ards of criminal prosecution and, as long as these do not violate
traditional ideas of basic justice and human rights, due process
requirements will be deemed to have been complied with by the
state. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 175 (1899). In a criminal
case due process necessarily requires the following: A law creating
or defining an offense; a court of competent jurisdiction; accusation
in due form; notice and opportunity to answer the charge; trial
according to the settled course of judicial proceeding; and the right
to be discharged if found not guilty. Dutiel v. State, 135 Neb. 811,
284 N.W. 321 (1939).
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One of the purposes of the due process clause is to prevent
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The hearing or trial must be in
fact a fair one. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). A fair
trial necessarily includes the introduction of evidence and, to con-
form with the requirements of due process, the evidence must be
considered according to the settled usage of judicial procedure.
State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949).
Municipal ordinances adopted by state authority constitute
"state action" and are therefore within the reach of this clause.
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940). Action of state courts
and state judicial officers in their official capacities is "state action."
Kenney v. Fox, 132 F. Supp. 305 (W. D. Mich. 1955). The test as
to whether requirements of due process have been met is simply
whether the law operates equally on all who come within the class
to be affected. State v. Erickson, 225 Iowa 1261, 282 N.W. 728
(1938).
In determining the issue of due process the Supreme Court
will generally accept the determination of the trier of the facts
unless that determination so lacks support in evidence that to give
it effect would work a fundamental unfairness amounting to denial
of due process. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). Appar-
ently, the requirement of some evidence to support a criminal
prosecution is so basic to any criminal proceeding that the ques-
tion of complete lack of evidence has rarely arisen. It hardly needs
elaboration that a conviction without any evidence at all would
amount to purely arbitrary decision. That such arbitrary action
on the part of a state agency amounts to denial of due process under
the fourteenth amendment necessarily follows.
In the principal case the only question before the Supreme
Court was whether the charges against the petitioner were so
utterly devoid of evidentiary support that to base a conviction
thereon would be an unconstitutional denial of due process. As to
the charge of loitering there was not a suggestion of evidence of
YP's guilt. The second charge of disorderly conduct was sought to
be substantiated by the police officer's testimony to the effect that
P was argumentative. There was no evidence that P in any way
disturbed the peace of Louisville, and, furthermore, Kentucky law
seems to hold that, if a man wrongfully arrested fails to object to
the arresting officer, he waives any right to complain later that the
arrest was unlawful. Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495, 496
(Ky. 1955). A conviction on such dearth of evidence, apparently
3
Mc K.: Constitutional Law--Due Process--Evidence Required to Sustain Cri
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960
CASE COMMENTS
based upon purely arbitrary judgment by the police court, is indeed
shocking to traditional concepts of ordered liberty.
The far-reaching possibilities of this case are suggested by
the direct routing from the police court of the City of Louisville to
the Supreme Court of the United States. Under the Kentucky
statutes police court fines of less than $20.00 on a single charge
are not appealable or otherwise reviewable in any other Kentucky
court. Thompson v. City of Louisville, supra at 4194. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari because of the substantial questions of due
process. Thompson v. Louisville, 360 U.S. 916 (1959). Does this
open the door to a multitude of similar petitions to the Supreme
Court involving petty fines? Probably not. Instances of complete
lack of evidence are probably rare. It is doubtful that the Supreme
Court would accept a similar case where there is some evidence to
substantiate the judgment. The effect of this decision may have
some influence in producing more cautious observation of due
process procedures and requirements by lesser tribunals.
The right of appeal is not of itself a requirement of due process.
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 508 (1903). But the right to a fair
trial is part of due process, and the demands of due process have
been met as long as one ample hearing is provided. Ohio ex rel.
Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930). Fail-
ure of Kentucky to provide for review of police court fines under
$20.00 does not in itself amount to denial of due process. In the
instant case there is no question of the adequacy of P's right to
review since a state has the power to provide its own modes of
procedure for judicial administration, and there is no claim that
Kentucky fails to provide adequate review facilities. P was provided
the same judicial machinery available to others in a similar situation.
The only denial of due process is that a conviction was rendered
without evidence in support thereof. Although the state's failure
to provide review is not denial of due process, the state may be
placing an unnecessary burden on the Supreme Court by not pro-
viding review of police court fines when constitutional questions
are involved.
That the principal case ever reached the Supreme Court is a
tribute to the high calibre of justice achieved by our society. But
that such a case of necessity must be determined by the highest
court of the land because of the inadequacy of a state's review
procedure shows a weakness in our system. How Kentucky and
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other states will react to this spotlight on the gap in review pro-
cedure when there is no fair hearing below remains to be seen.
J. McK.
CitMnuAL LAw-ATrFr To RECEIVE STOLEN PROPERTY-FACT
THAT PRoPERTY WAs No LONGER STOLEN HE=D IMmATERIAL.-Six
automobile tires were stolen but were recovered by the police.
Upon being advised by one of the thieves that he was in the process
of taking the tires to sell to a certain service station operator, the
arresting officer suggested that he proceed with his plan and com-
plete the sale. This was done and the service station operator was
charged with an attempt to receive stolen property. In seeking a
writ of prohibition, D, the service station operator, argued that the
property was no longer stolen, since it had been recovered from the
thieves, and therefore an essential element of the crime was missing.
Held, even assuming that the character of the property had been
changed from "stolen" to "recovered" (and that therefore prosecu-
tion for receiving stolen property would not lie), defendant had
attempted to receive stolen property when he purchased the tires
believing them to have been stolen and with an intent to keep them
from the true owner. Faustina v. Superior Court, 345 P.2d 542
(Calif. 1959).
The problem of impossibility in the principal case is one small
facet of the field of criminal attempts. An analysis of this facet, out
of context, would be impractical-indeed, to take such an approach
would be to succumb to the procedure which will be criticized in
this comment. Rather, the analysis will cover the entire area of
criminal attempts.
The courts have failed to recognize, and they have become
victims of, the elusive irony of the law of attempts. They have
divorced the attempt to commit a crime from the crime attempted
and have joined all the myriad forms of attempt into a single body
of substantive law, disregarding the dissimilarities among the indi-
vidual attempts. Any law that deals with intent and the workings
of the human mind without physical consummation is intrinsically
subjective. In reducing all attempts to a unified body of law the
courts have thus striven to catalogue elements of mental and moral
manifestations that defy codification by our limited human methods.
It follows that the most patently insignificant misdemeanors con-
stitute the least comprehended and least satisfactorily resolved field
of criminal law.
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